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Starting from the perception of innovation as a multi actor, multi level strategic game, 
this  paper  addresses  the  role  of  strategic  intelligence,  more  in  particular  of  TA,  in 
systemic innovation policies. First the history of TA in the US and Europe over the last 4 
decades are described and its role in innovation policies discussed. Hereafter the role 
and  (possible)  impact  of  strategic  intelligence  and  systemic  innovation  policies  is 
analysed. Two recent cases of Constructive TA are used to illustrate how this role is 
operationalised. The paper is concluded with conclusions on how strategic intelligence 
may further reinforce systemic innovation policies. Special attention is paid to the role of 




This volume conceives of innovation as a non-linear, multi-level, and multi-actor game with 
many  interactions  or  feedbacks  among  those  actors.    We  assume  that  innovation  theory, 
practice, and intervention develop by interactions among the worlds of science, policy, and 
practice [see chapter Kuhlmann et al, Teubel et al]. According to this view, we can no longer 
see innovation as a given thing – as an invention. Instead, innovation is a systemic process 
involving a heterogeneous set of actors who are inspired by both the potential that science and 
technology offer and by the context in which they have to function. These actors are involved 
in a complex decision making process that leads to innovative activity. 
 
In this chapter, we will examine an important consequence of this shared conception: the need 
of actors for information that enables them to engage in innovative activities in an adequate 
and effective way. We call this information Strategic Intelligence (SI) [see also chapter Polt], 
and actors involved in innovation require it to develop their visions, strategies, and plans of 
action. Apart from this ‘instrumental’ role, SI helps to reflect on the development, interaction 
and effectiveness of innovation theory, practice, and intervention. By this, SI provides an 
important input in the further development of these three concepts. 
 
There are many types of strategic intelligence [Kuhlmann et al, 1999; Tübke et al, 2004]. In 
this chapter we will focus on one particular strand: technology assessment (TA). TA emerged 
in the US in the late 1960’s and developed along multiple paths. In this chapter, we focus only 
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on TA in the public sector specifically related to knowledge-based innovation on one hand, 
and social implications on the other. This view necessarily excludes aspects of TA in the 
private  sector,  foresight,  and  other  TA-like  activities  in  the  public  sector,  such  as 
environmental impact assessment. This focus is of necessity somewhat  arbitrary, but it is 
through public sector innovation policies that, in our view, the interactions between TA as a 
form of strategic intelligence and innovation theory, practice, and policy are most clearly 
visible. We will begin the chapter with a brief overview of the development of TA, in the 
United  States  and  Europe,  over  the  last  four  decades,  and  discuss  some  aspects  of  its 
institutional and intellectual diversity. The next section will elaborate our concept of SI and of 
TA as a type of SI. We will then develop a framework that allows for a more differentiated 
evaluation  of  the  role  of  SI  in  policy-making.    We  will  conclude  with  two  detailed  case 
studies  of  more  contemporary  TA:  real-time  technology  assessment  and  constructive 
technology assessment, both focusing on emerging nanotechnologies. From the earlier history 
and the recent examples, we will explore the (possible) role of TA in systemic innovation 
polices and whether a ‘dominant design’ for TA is in place. Finally, we draw conclusions 
about improving the impact of TA as  a major  form of SI in systemic  innovation theory, 
practice, and policy. 
 
2. Technology Assessment 
 
A moving target 
TA originated in the US at the end of the 1960s as a reaction to many unexpected negative 
effects of new technologies and the problems encountered in ‘making technology work’ in the 
way users intended. These two factors were important, although partial, rationales for the 
proposal in US Congress to establish an early warning system for possible effects of new 
technologies. TA was initially positioned – to use the terminology of Smits and Leyten [1991] 
– mainly as a ‘watchdog’. Founded as a scientific discipline that would systematically identify 
and  evaluate  science  and  technology  for  their  consequences  for  social,  cultural,  political, 
economic, and environmental systems, TA has since become more of a ‘tracker’ – in which it 
is  not  so  much  an  outcome  of  scientific  analysis  as  an  ongoing  process  of  analysing 
developments in science, technology, and innovation, their consequences, and the discussions 
about them. In table 2 these two types of TA are characterized further. 
 
Table 2: Watchdog- and Tracker TA characterized 
Watchdog
3  Tracker 
Technology (impact) analysis 
Project oriented 
Actors not heavily involved 







Emphasis on developing problem definition 
Support actors in innovation processes 
Research and discussion 
Pluriform, de-centralized TA-capacity 
 
                                                 
3 Vary  Coates  [1975]  provides  a  definition  that  reflects  the  watchdog  type  of  TA:  TA  is  the  systematic 
identification and evaluation of the potential secondary consequences (whether beneficial or detrimental) of 
technology  in  terms  of  its  impact  on  social,  cultural,  political,  economic  and  environmental  systems  and 
processes. TA is intended to provide a neutral, factual input into the decision-making process.   4 
Nowadays, at least in Europe, TA is primarily expected to supply information that enables 
people involved in decision-making about innovation to determine appropriate strategies. TA 
thus aims to support decision-making; contribute to the socialisation of decision-making on 
science, technology, and innovation; and improve the social utilisation of science, technology, 
and innovation. Many of the participatory approaches developed within TA attempt to give a 
say to citizens who formerly had little or no voice in decision-making on science, technology, 
and innovation, but nevertheless bring important perspectives to the discussion. Indeed, the 
participation of stakeholders and users has been appearing more prominently on the agenda of 
the development of TA [Smits & Weijers, 1991; Decker et al, 2004; Sclove, 1990]. 
 
This development, principally over the last 15 years, has also included the formulation of 
constructive technology assessment (CTA) [Rip et al, 1995] and other initiatives that reinforce 
the process character of TA, involve users more effectively, and enhance the link with policy 
[Grin et al, 1997; Guston and Sarewitz, 2002]. Although much progress has been made, the 
integration of TA in innovation policies remains a problem. This conclusion could, however, 
be phrased the other way round: Until now, policy-makers have paid but little attention to the 
lessons learned by TA about strategic intelligence in innovation. 
 
In hindsight this shift in TA can be conceived as an ongoing learning process driven by 
interactions  between  science,  policy  and  practice.  From  practice  it  became  clear  that  the 
impact oriented, R&D and project-based type of TA with its heavy influences of the linear 
model of innovation was not very effective. The watchdog TA showed many traces of the 
rational but rather optimistic rational planning theories from the 1960s [Simon, 1976; van 
Vught, 1980] demonstrating a great trust in the potential of scientific research to ‘know’ the 
future. The TA community drew the conclusion that TA should not focus so much on R&D 
but on the innovation process as a whole and organize its work as a complementary process 
carried out in close interaction with all relevant actors. This approach was supported and 
influenced  by  developments  in  innovation  theory.  The  TA  community  learned  from  the 
emergence  of  the  innovation  systems  approach  with  its  emphasis  on  process  with  many, 
interlinked heterogeneous actors [Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992], research in the role of 
users [von Hippel, 1988 & 2005; Akrich, 1995; Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003] and evolutionary 
approaches  like  the  Social  Construction  of  Technology  [Bijker,  1995],  evolutionary 
economics [Nelson & Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988] and Technology Dynamics [van de Belt & 
Rip, 1987].  
 
The lack of impact on policy making stimulated many changes in the conception and practices 
of TA and was one of the major driving forces behind the shift from watchdog to tracker. The 
impact of these changes on policy, however, has not been clear. We suggest two reasons for 
this persistent lack of apparent impact:  first, policy discourse continued to be dominated by 
linear accounts of innovation, so policy makers were not  asking questions that TA could 
answer [Smits & Weijers, 1991]; and second, a persistent tension existed between the world 
of TA with its societal, sometimes technology-critical orientation, and the world of innovation 
policy with its heavy emphasis on economic goals. In the US, the absence of a centralised 
innovation policy complicates the issue even further. These factors over the years proved to 
be important barriers to the development of a fruitful interaction between TA and policy. 
 
The hypothesis in this chapter is that the gap between TA and policy practice is beginning to 
narrow, due predominantly to recent developments in, and interactions between, research, 
policy  and  practice,  in  particular  the  growing  influence  of  evolutionary  and  systemic   5 
approaches to understanding innovation. To explore this hypothesis further we first will dive 
deeper in the development of TA in the US and Europe over the last 40 years. 
 
40 years TA in the US 
From 1974 to 1995, it was said that TA in the US was whatever the Office of Technology 
Assessment happened to be doing.  While OTA existed, that formulation avoided a number of 
complications, among them the sheer diversity of OTA’s activities, the role of TA in the US 
innovation system, and the role of the US Congress as the monopsonistic consumer of OTA’s 
work. 
 
The  general  arc  of  OTA’s  history  is  well  known:  There  was  a  significant  but  under-
recognized and widely  distributed TA capacity in the executive branch of the US federal 
government [Coates, 1975]. Congress, which had been grappling with its authority over S&T 
through the 1960s, began to consider its own role in TA [Stine, 1986]. Caught in a wider 
battle  with  President  Nixon  over  the  institutional  bases  of  political  power,  Congress 
augmented  its  own  status  through  a  host  of  innovations,  including  OTA  [Bimber,  1996; 
Bimber and Guston, 1997]. OTA evolved from a troubled start-up to a respected collection of 
brokers and analysts of technical analysis. The Republicans, who gained the majority in the 
House of Representatives in 1995 for the first time in two generations, targeted OTA as both 
partisan and redundant and cancelled appropriations for the office. 
 
This story, however, neglects at least four crucial issues: First, OTA had external critics all 
along, particularly those [e.g., Bereano, 1997; Sclove, 1995] who disparaged its technocratic 
orientation.   Even Harvey Brooks, who helped craft OTA’s chartering legislation, was by the 
mid-1980s arguing for a TA that was both more engaged with the public and with researchers. 
Second, OTA strayed far from the foresight capacity that the original legislation contemplated, 
and conceived of its work more as policy analysis than as TA in that original sense. Third, 
OTA had internal critics who helped it establish a modest but perceptive reflexive capacity 
and who, had the office not been de-funded, might have succeeded in reorienting it. Fourth, 
OTA’s policy impact was not easily apparent, thus helping to create the environment in which 
congressional Republicans found themselves able to close the office (we will expand on this 
below). 
 
Reconstituting TA in the US 
Immediately after OTA’s demise, the consensus (or hope) among many of its former analysts 
was that the Republican ascendancy would quickly wane and OTA could be revived.  These 
analysts, together with other friends of the office, constituted the private, non-profit Institute 
for Technology Assessment as a holding pen of sorts. Intertwined with this effort was XOTA, 
a loosely knit but formally incorporated group of former OTA employees who lobbied for 
OTA’s re-establishment. XOTA has a board of directors and other officers but has done little 
more than maintain a directory of OTA alumni and a list serve, and host an annual social 
function. 
 
Granger Morgan and John Peha, both of Carnegie Mellon University, began a larger effort in 
2001  with  a  conference  on  S&T  policy  advice  to  Congress,  funded  by  the  Heinz  and 
MacArthur Foundations and supported by 18 professional and academic science policy groups.  
Well-coordinated with congressional staff and members, the meeting was ostensibly a bi-
partisan activity, allied with a bill introduced in Congress to re-establish a TA capacity.  But 
Republican  involvement  was  largely  limited  to  moderate,  Eastern  Republicans  with  long 
tenures on the committees that dealt with science and technology issues.  Morgan and Peha   6 
[2003]  published  a  book  from  the  conference,  and  congressional  advocates  made  a  tiny 
incremental step – authorization for a pilot technology assessment by the GAO (then, the 
General Accounting Office; now the Government Accountability Office) on biometrics [GAO 
2002; also see Fri, Morgan and Stiles 2002].  Most observers agree that TA for Congress will 
remain moribund at least until another partisan realignment, and thus some [e.g., Sarewitz 
1996] have called for a more widely distributed TA capacity. 
 
Other tools 
The focus on OTA neglects other efforts in the US that can reasonably be considered as TA, 
e.g., the forecasting and environmental impact assessments mentioned above. One approach 
with a significant impact is road mapping, especially as developed by SEMATECH, a public-
private  partnership  aimed  at  restoring  US  pre-eminence  in  the  semiconductor  industry. 
SEMATECH  pioneered  the  use  of  roadmaps  to  identify  future  goals  and  bottlenecks  for 
semiconductor R&D, for example, what kinds of innovations were necessary, and when, to 
remain on the trajectory described by Moore’s Law. A key feature of the roadmaps was their 
dynamic nature: They evolved through time both to integrate technological advances and to 
include increasing detail on benchmarks and obstacles. While the value of such roadmaps has 
not been fully assessed, some in the industry give them credit for catalyzing the renaissance of 
US  semiconductor  technologies.  Public  sponsors  of  research  in  the  US,  particularly  the 
Department  of  Energy  and  more  recently  the  National  Institutes  of  Health,  have  begun 
crafting roadmaps as well, although it is not clear whether these achieve the methodological 
sophistication or the level of detail of SEMATECH’s. 
 
Variations  on  TA  also  found  a  home  in  “futurism,”  a  loosely  defined  practice  aiming  to 
illuminate  potential  technological  and  social  trajectories  to  support  present-day  decision-
making.  In particular, a number of small consulting groups, started in the 1980s, support the 
strategic decision processes of private and public sector institutional clients dealing with rapid 
technological change. By seeking to inform decision-making based on scenarios of the future, 
these groups occupied the intellectual ground abandoned by OTA shortly after its inception. 
These groups also tended toward technological optimism, although such groups as the Club of 
Rome and the WorldWatch Institute could be construed as engaged in future-oriented TA 
with a more pessimistic view. 
 
Persistent  tensions  surrounding  knowledge-based  innovation  have  led,  more  recently,  to 
government support of  research on the “ethical, legal, and social implications” (ELSI) of 
major S&T initiatives. The first major ELSI program in the US was an add-on to the Human 
Genome Project. Its goal was to conduct ethics research on genomics, rather than to influence 
or  support  decision-making  or  policy.  More  recently,  the  US  Congress  passed  legislation 
mandating a societal implications program for nanotechnology [Fisher and Mahajan 2006], 
specifying  that  the  program  should  help  improve  the  societal  value  of  nanotechnology 
research by involving both the nanotechnology researchers and the public. The legislation 
neglected to specify particular mechanisms for such involvement [Bennett and Sarewitz, in 
press]. 
 
Research  on  the  social  dynamics  of  knowledge-based  innovation  suggest  that  the 
decentralized approaches encouraged by such legislation might be more feasible and desirable 
than  a  single,  national-level  effort.  Given  the  magnitude,  diversity,  and  scope  of  the  US 
innovation  system,  approaches  rooted  in  the  organization  of  R&D  institutions  themselves 
make sense. Melding cutting-edge innovation with ELSI research to enable more reflexive 
institutions  farther  upstream  in  the  innovation  process  could  be  a  more  effective  way  to   7 
encourage the anticipatory governance of emerging technologies. One such approach has been 
described as “real-time technology assessment” [Guston and Sarewitz, 2002]. A new effort to 
test this integrated approach, described in more detail below, has recently begun at the Center 
for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University. 
 
To wind up, OTA started as a rather lame watchdog and over the years turned into an efficient 
policy analysis institute with some qualities of a tracker. Lack of visible impact and a well 
developed  innovation  policy,  not  to  mention  raw  politics,  in  the  end  caused  its  demise. 
Attempts to resuscitate the agency have not been very successful. At the same time outside 
OTA the development of formal and informal TA went on, resulting in a number of promising 
approaches integrating different perspectives on new technologies and better linked to major 
actors involved in innovation processes. 
 
40 years TA in Europe 
As in the US, we can characterize the first wave of TA in Europe in the 1970s as the rise of 
the watchdog. Fear of the negative effects of technology acted as a major driving force. Other 
important  aspects  in  the  early  days  were  links  with  environmental  movements,  a  societal 
anti-technology attitude, and student revolts. In retrospect, we can conclude that in this period, 
the institutionalisation of TA in Europe failed because of the lack of interest of politicians and 
a too-naïve concept of TA [Smits & Leyten, 1991, Smits, Leyten & Den Hertog, 1995]. 
 
Unlike in the US, a second wave of TA in Europe broke in the 1980s, characterised by the 
emergence  of  the  tracker.  TA  was  viewed  in  a  broader  and  more  sophisticated  way,  not 
simply avoiding negative effects but pursuing a better integration of science and technology in 
society. The anti-technology attitude faded, and TA received the opportunity to play a role in 
innovation  as  seen  from  an  economic  as  well  as  a  broader  societal  perspective  (health, 
environment, well being). The interest in TA grew in policy circles at national and supra 
national level as was demonstrated by two European TA congresses organized by the EC;  in 
1987 in Amsterdam, [De Hoo et al, 1987], and and 1991 in Milan, [Smits & Weijers, 1991]. 
In the same period, due to the heavy economic recession, innovation policy came on the 
political agenda. TA developed into a more policy-oriented instrument, geared to support 
actors involved in innovation processes. By this, the gap between the societal and economic 
approach of innovations slowly narrowed. An illustration of the impact of this narrowing gap 
is the TA on the impact of what in those days was called micro-electronics (ICT). In the 
Rathenau report [Adviesgroep micro-electronika, 1980] not only the economic impact of ICT, 
but  also  the  societal  impact  was  addressed.  The  same  accounted  for  a  TA  on  genetic 
engineering  [Brede  DNA  Cie,  1983].  This  development  is  reflected  in  the  rise  of  a  new 
concept  of  TA  as  “…consisting  of  analysis  of  technological  developments  and  their 
consequences and discussions about them. The aim of TA is to provide information that will 
help the parties involved to determine their strategy and enables them to define new objects 
for TA-research” [Smits & Leyten, 1991].  In this period, also a number of TA organisations 
were established of which most of them were linked to national parliaments [Vig & Paschen, 
2000]. However it should be noted that this ‘second wave’ by far went smoothly. Long and 
difficult political debates as for instance in Germany often preceded the establishment of the 
various TA organizations. Moreover their mandates and resources often were very limited. 
Apart from political struggles one of the major reasons for this troublesome birth was related 
to the fact that in those days innovation policy in most European countries still carried many 
elements  of  the  linear  model  as  was  demonstrated  by  its  strongly  supply  side  (R&D) 
orientation (see also section 3). As a result, the impact of TA on policy still was rather meagre. 
   8 
Continuing its distinction from the US, European TA experienced in the early 1990s a third 
wave that focused on the further development of the toolkit of the tracker dog and attempts to 
strengthen links with policy. Keywords here are participation, demand articulation, TA as a 
process. TA more  and  more was viewed as a  source of Strategic  Intelligence, supporting 
actors involved in innovation processes to better handle the interface between supply of and 
demand for technology. Despite these intentions, TA in Europe still was in a rather isolated 
and sub-critical position. The already mentioned 2
nd European TA Congress, organized by the 
European Commission, in Milan in 1990 took stock of the state-of-the-art of TA in Europe. 
Although a number of TA institutions were in place, the world of TA remained fragmented 
and  the  institutions  themselves  were  sub-critical  and  often  fell  short  of  required  quality 
standards and expectations for impact on policy. These shortcomings, in combination with the 
ever-growing importance of innovation, induced a debate on how to improve the link between 
TA  and  innovation  policy,  including  discussions  on  quality  and  methodology.  From  such 
discussions emerged experimentation with TA approaches like ‘interactive TA,’ ‘participatory 
TA,’ and ‘constructive TA’ to improve the quality, impact, and interactivity of TA. As a sign 
of  further  institutionalisation,  the  European  parliamentary  TA  (EPTA)  organization 
consolidated and expanded its reach; EPTA nowadays involves 16 members and associates.  
 
We have mainly focused on the development of TA, but over this period, innovation policies 
in most OECD countries were evolving, too. Whereas, in the early 1980s innovation policies 
were still very much supply driven – in line with the linear model of innovation – diffusion 
policies, the demand side (users), and even systemic elements of innovation began to receive 
more attention. The almost exclusive focus on new inventions faded away, and it became 
clear that meeting broader societal goals as part of an innovation policy made sense from an 
economic perspective too. As a consequence, more actors and perspectives were included in 
innovation  policies.  This  development  confronted  policy  makers  –  who  meanwhile  had 
adopted the systems of innovation approach as the basis of their policies but struggled with 
the implementation – with the problem how to involve non-traditional actors, as for instance 
users, in an effective and efficient way in their policies. In the US, such policies included the 
Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts, as well as manufacturing extension, policies for pre-
competitive technologies such as the Advanced Technology Program, the rise of state and 
regional  S&T  policies,  and  the  coordination  of  national  initiatives  in  climate  change, 
information technology, genomics, and nanotechnology.  In Europe the integration of TA in 
the  European  Commissions  Framework  Program  (the  R&D  program  of  the  EC),  the  EC-
Targeted Socio-Economic Research program concentrating on TA-like research and striving 
after improving the link with policy, the recent establishment of the EC Technology Platforms 
and  the  establishment  of  the  Institute  for  Prospective  Technological  Studies,  an  EC  Joint 
Research  Centre,  intended  to  provide  Strategic  Intelligence  on  innovation  to  the  EC,  are 
important  examples.  On  national  level,  in  the  Netherlands,  linking  TA  to  ‘big’  science 
programs in the area of nanotechnology, climate change, carbon storage and genomics, as 
well  as  big  scale  research  and  practices  programs  that  should  improve  the  links  between 
science and application in areas as agriculture (see chapter: Teubal et al), water management 
and  mobility  are  more  recent  examples  of  this  trend.  The  core  characteristic  of  all  these 
activities is attention to the needs, wishes and constraints of users and other societal actors 
(including policy-makers) in an early stage of the development of a new technology. Also the 
UK  Foresight  Program  and  the  German  Futur  Program  (see  chapter:  Teubal  et  al)  are 
manifestations of this new type of TA. In the UK Foresight program panels of scientists, 
policy  makers  and  industrialists  in  a  process  combining  research  and  debate  designed 
scenarios for the future development of some 10 sectors of the British society ranging from   9 
transport to chemistry, maybe seen as a manifestation. The German Futur Program strived 
after starting a broad societal debate on the future of science and technology. 
 
This  combination  of  policy  change  and  development  of  TA  in  the  1990s  opened  up 
opportunities for TA to better link with, and have influence on, innovation policies. But here 
too stubborn problems in the relation between  TA and policy circles,  as well  as the still 




In innovation systems many heterogeneous actors play a role. From recent research it has 
become  clear  that  users  are  of  special  importance  here,  as  confirmed  by  the  U.S.  and 
European TA experience.  In the  following we will focus on the role of TA and users in 
innovation  processes  to  further  illustrate  the  development  and  potential  of  TA  and  the 
resulting  consequences  for  policy.  Before  we  explore  two  more  recent  examples  of  TA 
developments that elaborate user involvement, we first dig a little deeper into the reasons why 
it is important to involve users. 
 
As is clear from the above discussions, the selection, generation, introduction, and application 
of scientific and technological knowledge increasingly demands a two-way learning process. 
A fruitful interaction between producers and users benefits both parties [von Hippel, 1988; 
Smits, 2002; Akrich, 1995]. Smits and Den Hertog [2007] articulate five reasons to justify 
such interaction: 1) Interaction provides for more effective articulation of social needs in the 
face of market failures and other limits of private initiatives. 2) Interaction can increase the 
competitive strength of enterprises by helping to equilibrate the innovative process and its 
products  with  public  expectations.  3)  Interaction  can  improve  acceptance  and  social 
embedding of knowledge and technologies by tailoring innovations at an earlier stage. 4) 
Interaction can improve the learning capacity of society as a whole, but increasing the ability 
of users to articulate their needs and of producers to become more open and responsive to 
them. And 5), interaction can enhance democracy by allowing for citizens to influence the 
course of science and technology. 
 
Each  of  these  reasons  could  be  sufficient  in  itself  to  justify  greater  user  involvement  in 
innovation processes. All of them tend to increase the democratic and  rational quality of 
decision-making because more perspectives are considered. These rationales also appeal to 
actors across multiple sectors, as private firms will find the second and third reasons critical to 
the bottom line, and governments will find a better articulation of needs and demands (the 
first), an enhanced learning capacity of society as a whole (the fourth), and greater citizen 
participation in innovation processes (the fifth) important for succeeding in achieving policy 
goals and in maintaining legitimacy. 
 
In these interactions, expanded TA activities thus converge with, or take on the characteristics 
of, the broader category of Strategic Intelligence with which we started. In the following 
section, we return to SI and elaborate its role in systemic innovation policies. 
3. Strategic Intelligence and Systemic Innovation Policies 
 
In this section we discuss the nature of SI and the role it could play in systemic innovation 
policy. We start with recent insights from innovation studies and policy concepts based on   10 
these  insights.  We  then  turn  to  explaining  the  different  dimensions  and  types  of  SI  and 
conclude the section by further explicating TA as a specific strand of SI. 
 
Trends in innovation policy 
To put this discussion in a better perspective we first will go a little bit further in major 
developments in innovation policy in OECD countries.
4  In decades following World War II, 
most  OECD  countries  had  nothing  in  place  that  resembled  an  explicit  innovation  policy. 
Propelled by the economic recession, innovation policy started to develop in the late 1970s. It 
became clear that OECD economies no longer could compete on prices and wages, but had to 
shift to added value embodied in new or advanced products and services. First attempts to 
develop an innovation policy, inspired by the linear model, were strongly supply-oriented and 
dominated by financial instruments stimulating R&D. This policy was not very successful 
because firms did not incorporate R&D results. Roobeek [1990], pointed out that almost all 
OECD countries were facing the same type of problems.  
 
The solution to this problem was sought in strengthening the intermediary infrastructure in 
order to better be able to ensure that new technologies also reached the firms. This resulted in 
the development of policy instruments stimulating mobility of researchers from academia to 
private enterprise and in many technology transfer programs. Without doubt, these activities 
improved the utilization of new technologies, but in the early 1990s it became clear that 
policy could not be restricted to measures that only encouraged the production and diffusion 
of  knowledge.  A  considerable  mismatch  between  the  needs  of  private  firms  and  the 
knowledge produced was apparent all too often. A better interaction between the producers 
and the suppliers of knowledge was  essential to be  able to cope with  this problem. This 
awareness was the start of the next phase in innovation policy: the user-oriented approach. In 
this phase it was not only the interface between the users and the producers that was improved, 
but also the supportive infrastructure was expanded by introducing new or improved forms of 
strategic  intelligence,  more  advanced  risk  capital  schemes,  a  high-level  electronic 
infrastructure, changes in educational systems, and other conditions that facilitated innovation 
in networks and systems. Furthermore we see in this phase the addition of policy instruments 
to support companies at an organizational level in innovation processes (management advice 
and support) and instruments that enhance the interface between users and producers in both 
directions. The trend towards such instruments helped companies not only to absorb new 
technologies, but also to turn them into new and successful products and services.  Bessant 
and Rush [1995] argued that innovation does not stop when a new technology is adopted by 
the  potential  user  and  that  it  is  necessary  to  develop  approaches  that  help  to  bridge  the 
managerial gap. However, in the 1990s, firms were still very inwardly focused, or at best 
focused on bilateral relations, while financial instruments still heavily dominated the policy 
portfolio [Boekholt et al, 2001].  
 
The developments as sketched in the foregoing imply that more and more actors were getting 
involved  in  the  development  and  implementation  of  innovation  policies.  Through  this 
evolution, the need for system-level thinking and intervention increased; we term this the 
systemic  phase  of  innovation  policy.    Policy  makers  were  discovering  the  concept  of 
innovation systems (IS), which in turn was leading to a variety of richer visualizations, such 
as the rise of the so-called ‘cluster approach’ adopted by many OECD countries [OECD, 
2002]. This great interest in the IS approach however does not imply that policy makers have 
been able to put the IS to work in their daily practice. In the context of this chapter, the most 
relevant problems attendant on a systems approach include the involvement of more relevant 
                                                 
4 For more in depth analysis of the development of innovation policies see: Kuhlmann, 2003; Edler et al, 2003, and Arnold et al, 2003.   11 
actors, broadening the scope of innovation policies, the empowerment of actors, organizing 
learning  and  experimenting,  the  set  up  of  an  integrated  infrastructure  for  SI  and  the 
orchestration of instruments in order to realize goals defined on a systemic level and prevent 
unwanted  interaction.  In  the  following  we  will  focus  on  one  of  these  problems:  the 
development of a SI infrastructure. 
 
Strategic Intelligence: theory and policy 
Strategic intelligence deals with the questions who needs what kind of information in order to 
let actors maximise their innovation efforts and how can this information be produced? The 
answers to these questions depend on which innovation model one adheres to. In a linear 
model, the technology is more or less given and only needs ‘unveiling’. No strong distinction 
is made between invention and innovation, the problem definition is rather clear and simple 
from the beginning, the major audiences are policy makers and firms, and the most important 
goal is to inform actors on emerging technologies and their possible impacts. The production 
of SI thus proceeds along the lines of ‘normal’ science, the broad array of societal actors are 
hardly involved in this process, and the interface with them is limited to providing (some) 
input in the problem definition and to providing reports. Watchdog TA is in line with this 
perception of innovation processes. 
 
In a systemic model of innovation policy, the nature and role of SI are far more complex. We 
may understand this complexity by looking at recent insights from innovation studies and 
characteristics of innovation policies based on these concepts, as summarized by Smits & Den 
Hertog  [2007]:  1)  Innovation  is  an  interactive  search  process  that  takes  place  under 
uncertainty. 2) Innovation and technological change are endogenous processes and the result 
of co-evolution of technology and society. 3) Learning and creating learning environments are 
crucial to innovation. 4) Innovation and technological change are increasingly linked directly 
to  scientific  knowledge  and  involve  a  variety  of  transfer  mechanisms.  5)  In  addition  to 
knowledge creation, knowledge diffusion and knowledge utilization are crucial. 6) Innovation 
also demands knowledge and understanding of organizational innovation, services, and other 
“soft” aspects of innovation.From this overview, and particularly from points 1, 3 and 6, it is 
clear that many aspects related to innovation processes ask for SI. SI may help actors involved 
to  develop  their  visions  and  strategies  and  to  turn  these  into  concrete  plans  of  action. 
Innovation policy concepts and instruments basing themselves on these theoretical insights 
also reflect this need. In the chapter of Teubal, Smits & Kuhlmann a number of so called 
systemic  instruments  are  proposed  of  which  at  least  two  explicitly  refer  to  the  need  for 
learning  and  an  adequate  infrastructure  for  SI.  This  point  may  further  be  emphasised  by 
referring to the plea for new types of governance in innovation polices, as stated in the so 
called ‘Karlsruhe Principles’, formulated by Edler et al [2003]. 
 
Dimensions of strategic intelligence 
The foregoing not only points at the importance of SI for systemic innovation policies, but it 
also has consequences for the content and the nature of SI. With regard to content, it will be 
clear that the systemic approach emphasises that although technology (the invention) may be 
given, the way in which technologies end up in our societies (the innovation) certainly is not. 
Moreover, it is often not clear which questions actors have to ask when confronted with a new 
technology. As a consequence, problem definition takes real effort, including identifying the 
broad and heterogeneous set of actors that should be involved and providing insight into their 
positions,  goals  and  interests.  But  a  useful  problem  definition  is  only  the  first  step  in 
articulating the demands of the involved actors and in the remaining, complex and highly 
interactive learning process. Hence, SI has to be conceived as a process that transcends the   12 
scientific arena to involve non-technical actors and non-technical information.  In order to 
manage such a process, much attention has to be paid to (facilitation of) the various interfaces 
between actors with different backgrounds and expertises. SI also includes more than only 
providing knowledge, but also intervenes in, and partly shapes this decision-making process. 
This makes the question of how SI is institutionalised in the innovation system very important. 
Questions like: who will get involved, which questions will be addressed, and how will the 
results of SI impact upon decision-making, are influenced by the institutional position of SI. 
We  can  thus  characterize  SI  along  the  dimensions  of  process  and  content  [Smits,  2001] 
(Table 2): 
Table 2: dimensions of SI. 
 
 
TA as a Type of SI 
We have mentioned that over the years multiple types of SI, each with their own goals and 
methodologies, have developed. Following Tübke et al. [2001], we can distinguish between 
five types of SI: Technology Forecasting, Technology Foresight, Technology Assessment, 
Evaluation, and Road Mapping. Each type is distinguished by its major task or goal, its field 
of application, and the kind of political or policy issues it addresses. Each type also has its 
own unique focus on different aspects of the process and content dimensions. Seen from the 
needs of innovation policy, one often has to combine these different types of SI. 
 
TA distinguishes itself from other forms of SI by its task focus on support for decision makers 
in national parliaments, and actors directly involved in innovation processes, as opposed to 
forecasting and road mapping, which concern concrete technological developments. It also 
distinguishes  itself  by  addressing  developing  technologies  in  a  problem-orientation,  as 
opposed  to  foresight,  which  addresses  a  broader  scope  of  early-warning  functions,  or 
evaluation, which addresses innovation policies retrospectively. TA also distinguishes itself 
through its concern for identifying options, its heavy emphasis on process (but not to the 
exclusion of content), and as a consequence, its extensive and intensive interaction with a 
wide variety of actors. These characteristics show much overlap with the tracker type of TA. 
For the remainder of this chapter, we will deal with TA as a prime example of SI. 
 
4. Impact of TA and Systemic Innovation Policy 
 
Introduction 
Content  Process 
￿  Tailor-made 
￿  Hard- and softside 
￿  Distributed character: 
￿  scale effects 
￿  facilitating learning 
￿  mix between specific and generic 
￿  enlarging accessibility 
￿  insights from interaction 
￿  Articulation of demand 
￿  Mobilising creativity 
￿  Elucidating 'tacit knowledge' 
￿  Assessment of the technological 
potential 
￿  Facilitating activities 
￿  Optimal link with decision-making 
￿  User involvement   13 
A major issue regarding SI in general and TA in particular is impact: How should the impact 
of TA be conceived? And how can impact be measured? 
If we consider TA, or for that matter SI itself, to be a kind of policy analysis, we might look to 
the  scholarship  on  the  impact  of  policy  analysis  for  some  initial  guidance.  The  Anglo-
American version of this literature, however, is long on attempts and short on findings, as it 
often concentrates too much on impact on “the decision” rather than on other aspects of policy 
making. Bimber’s study of OTA, for example, demonstrated few instances of spontaneous 
acknowledgement  of  OTA’s  influence  on  a  policy  decision  made  by  Congress  or  by 
individual members of Congress. Similarly, Bimber found relatively few mentions of OTA in 
the Congressional Record of debates on issues. OTA, less than other congressional agencies 
like the Congressional Budget Office, was not part of the vocabulary with which members of 
Congress justified their actions. There were, however, instances in which OTA’s work was 
absolutely  critical  to  a  particular  policy  outcome.  Indeed,  to  understand  the  hostility  of 
congressional Republicans to OTA one must also understand, for example, OTA’s impact on 
the debate over the Strategic Defence  Initiative and other defence policy questions in the 
1980s. Morgan and Peha [2003] document further concrete impacts of OTA as well. 
 
Mostly, however, OTA was a facilitator of communication around an issue. OTA was usually 
one  node  in  an  issue  network  that  contributed  to  congressional  information  on  that  issue 
(Whiteman 1986). In many issues, OTA was simply one among many nodes. In some, it was 
a  critical  node.    Sometimes,  for  example,  in  its  assessment  of  potential  human  genome 
projects  (Cook-Deegan  1995),  OTA  played  an  important  role  in  assembling  the  network. 
Even though OTA was not broadly participatory, it became expert in conducting stakeholder 
analysis  and  stakeholders’  meetings,  thus  smoothing  the  policy  waters  until  a  time  that 
Congress might decide to wade in. The impact of such efforts on problem definition and 
framing and on broader strategic intelligence are, however, hard to discern, and methods for 
identifying them, which would include detailed ethnographies of issues and information, are 
lacking. 
 
Another reason why OTA’s policy impacts may appear to be minimal is that the arena of US 
innovation policy is not usually geared to such input. There is no basic policy for science and 
technology, nor for innovation, that OTA could have helped construct. OTA’s 1991 report, 
Federally  Funded  Research:  Decisions  for  a  Decade,  is  a  detailed  and  sophisticated 
assessment – particularly when compared to post-OTA S&T policy documents like the 1998 
report issued by the House Science Committee chairman Vernon Ehlers – but there was little 
legislative opportunity to apply such analysis. To talk about OTA’s influence on innovation 
policy is to talk about its impact on little, rather than its little impact. In Europe too, policy 
makers often did not (or were not able to) formulate questions TAs that TA could answer. 
 
The previous OTA story shows that strategic intelligence, and TA in particular, needs a set of 
tools to assess its impact that can focus on learning across a broad swath of society. Such a 
learning focus is especially important for more participatory activities in which framing (set 
of relevant actors and problem definition) and learning  are at least as important goals as 
immediate influence in any event (Guston 1999a). In the following we explore a framework to 
evaluate the impact of a TA. We first discuss that every TA has its own environment in which 
it operates, i.e. TA’s are constrained by context and institutionalisation. Second, assessing 
impact should follow the general dimensions of SI: content and process. 
 
Environment of a TA: context and institutionalization   14 
TAs are never carried out in isolation. As the TAMI [2004] project noted, the process and 
impact of TAs are dependent on their context and institutionalisation. Context means the 
current situation of the technological field or problem at hand. Typical contextual questions 
include: How developed is the technology currently? Which actors are already involved and 
which only potentially? What governance arrangements have emerged around the technology 
to date? 
 
Institutionalisation  is  a  less  clear  concept.  Following  TAMI  [2004],  institutionalisation 
involves  five  factors:  problem  selection  and  definition,  the  relation  and  involvement  of 
important actors, the composition of the toolkit or choice of methods; the modes of project 
management and interaction; and the style and freedom of communication. 
 
Both context and institutionalisation can vary considerable from case to case and, moreover, 
can change during the  course of a TA process, e.g., institutionalisation is (partly) shaped 
through problem definition as existing TA institutions and resources constrain actors in their 
attempts to institutionalise a TA. Both also imply that impact must be addressed case-by-case, 




Assessing impact: content and process 
In assessing impact, we can talk about the role of a TA in influencing both the content and 
process of innovation policy.  Again, the first of the pair is relatively straightforward. Typical 
content-related  impacts  will  include  improved  understanding  among  decision-makers, 
stakeholders,  and  other  publics  of  the  TA  issues  involved,  substantive  analyses  and 
recommendations  regarding  choices  in  innovation  policy,  and  the  manifestation  of  such 
understanding, analyses, and recommendations in new policy. 
 
Typical procedural impacts include: identifying and empowering actors in such a way that 
they  can  play  their  roles  effectively,  e.g.,  by  enabling  actors  to  identify  and  meet  their 
information  needs;  bridging  the  gaps  of  information  and  influence  among  actors;
5 and 
contributing to the acceptance and use of TA results in decision-making. Such procedural 
impacts  not  only  contribute  to  the  quality  and  usefulness  in  a  more  restricted  way  by 
facilitating  the  provision  of  useful  content,  but  they  also  will  enhance  the  quality  of 
participation and empowerment in and impact of decision-making. 
 
In the long run, the latter result, although less visible than the provision of (in particular 
instrumental) knowledge or content, often turns out to be a very important type of impact. 
One  consequence  of  this  process  orientation  is  the  need  for  continuous  monitoring  –  to 
evaluate intermediate results, plan for any indicated redesign of the process, and appropriately 
attune expectations. 
 
There are many concepts that can be used to fill in the content and process measures of impact. 
One perspective that fits particularly well with the vision of TA as SI is conceiving of impact 
as the ability of actors to engage in substantive, procedural, and reflexive learning (Guston, 
1999a). Learning is a necessary step prior to behavioural change, i.e., acting differently within 
                                                 
5 Geurts  [1993]  distinguishes  between  four  types  of  gaps  between:  practical  policy  processes  and  science, 
different  (scientific)  disciplines,  administrators  and  citizens  and  between  experts  and  laymen,  between  the 
producers and the users of knowledge. Bridging the gap however does not imply consensus. It only points at 
enabling a fruitful dialogue between actors with different frames of reference and interests.   15 
the innovation process. Collective or social learning is of special interest, because a change in 
the so-called ‘shared frame of reference’ can occur. Such change means that actors position 
themselves  differently  when  making  up  their  mind  about  a  particular  issue  related to  the 
innovation process. An example would be when scientists make it a common practice take 
societal and ethical concerns into account in their work. 
 
Others  include  the  instrumental  and  conceptual  use  of  TA-results  (Caplan,  1979),  seven 
standards of utilization (Dunn, 1980), anticipation, reflection, and learning (Schot and Rip, 
1997), and timing of receiving and using information (Caplan, 1979). While we do not claim 
to know which conception of impact on content and process is the best – and it may be that 
different conceptions are appropriate for different contexts and institutionalisations of TA – 
we do claim that both the content and process dimensions are necessary components in every 
TA evaluation. TAs conceived as simple research projects will not be able to meet these 
conditions. 
 
In the next section we will explore how TA developed over the last 40 years from a ‘research 
project’  like  activity  into  a  ‘process-oriented  activity’  by  focusing  on  two  recent 
developments in TA – Real Time TA and Constructive TA. 
 
 
5.  Two cases of recent TA approaches: Real Time TA and 
Constructive TA 
 
TA approaches in the US and in Europe are under discussion in this section: (1) Real Time TA 
activities  at  the  Center  for  Nanotechnology  in  Society  at  Arizona  State  University,  and  (2) 
Constructive TA activities in the Dutch TA NanoNed program carried out in the Innovation Studies 
Group at Utrecht University. We start by giving the context, institutionalisation, and setups of 
both approaches. Second, we discuss the impact along the dimensions of content and process. 
We do have to make two remarks; first, the RTTA example plays at a higher level than the CTA 
example. This means that the latter is much more detailed, but on the other hand also of smaller scope. 
Second, in the case of RTTA, we can only discuss intended impact as the program is still 
unfolding  towards  its  full  capacity  and  activities  are  just  starting.  For  the  CTA  example, 
activities have been rounded up, and impacts are assessed and known. 
 
Real-Time TA in the US 
Real-time Technology  Assessment (RTTA) has a lineage of multiple strands. Guston and 
Sarewitz [2002] conceive of it as: 1) an incremental alteration of CTA for local consumption 
in the U.S.; 2) a response to the specific failings of the ELSI model; 3) a synthetic enterprise 
built on the analytic findings of science studies and innovation studies; and 4) an intellectual 
and  social  response  to  the  challenges  that  knowledge-based  innovation  poses  both  to 
governance and to the social sciences. The test-bed for RTTA has become the Center for 
Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University, which was created in October 2005 
under a $US 6.2 million grant from the National Science Foundation. As implemented at 
CNS-ASU, RTTA is somewhat evolved from its initial description in the literature, but its 
impulse, first, to conduct fundamental and applied social science and humanistic research 
alongside natural science and engineering research, and, second, to push attention to questions 
of the value of knowledge-based innovations further upstream, remains the same. 
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CNS-ASU maintains four program activities within RTTA:
6  
 
1) Research and Innovation System Assessment (RISA), which provides surveillance of nano-
scale  research  activities  through  a  variety  of  (mostly  quantitative)  methods.  In  particular, 
RISA activities at CNS-ASU map the ongoing research dynamics of nanotechnology through 
bibliometric  and  patent  analysis,  evaluate  the  public  value  of  nanotechnology  by 
understanding the relationship between promises on its behalf and emerging societal impacts, 
and assess the nanotechnology workforce needs of regions by conducting supply-and-demand 
analyses for regional nano-workforces. 
 
2) Public Opinion and Values (POV), which gathers both broad-brush and fine-grained data 
about knowledge of and attitudes toward nanotechnology and its societal implications from 
both researchers and lay-citizens. In particular, POV activities poll a large sample of the US 
public about their knowledge of and attitudes toward nanotechnology in a longitudinal and 
comparative perspective, study in a quasi-experimental fashion the impact of media reports on 
how  the  public  conceptualizes  nanotechnology,  and  survey  a  large  sample  of  nano-scale 
science  and  engineering  researchers  about  their  perspectives  on  nanotechnology,  for 
comparison to both the public poll and other data drawn from scientists. 
 
3) Deliberation and Participation (DP), which elicits input on technical and societal issues 
through deliberative and participatory exercises.  In particular, DP activities create “naïve” 
but technically validated nanotechnological scenarios for analysis and assessment by other 
CNS activities, propose responsible nanotechnological products through a trans-disciplinary 
undergraduate education module called “InnovationSpace”, critique the scenarios and other 
visions of nanotechnological futures with the tools of critical theory and critical analysis, and 
involve  scores  of  lay-citizens  in  the  assessment  of  nanotechnological  issues  through  a 
National Citizens’ Technology Forum. 
 
4) Reflexivity Assessment and Evaluation (RAE), which scrutinizes the activities and impacts 
of  CNS-ASU  at  the  micro-  and  macro-level.    In  particular,  RAE  activities  examine  the 
changing  identity,  knowledge,  and  practice  among  nano-scale  science  and  engineering 
researchers  with  whom  we  interact,  attempting  to  identify  changes  attributable  to  our 
influence, and reflect on CNS-ASU through international and other comparisons. 
CNS-ASU also addresses two crosscutting areas of substantive inquiry: Freedom, Privacy, 
and Security, in which researchers are particularly concerned with how the design of nano-
sensors may or may not build in important capacities for data acquisition and management; 
and  Human  Identity,  Enhancement,  and  Biology,  in  which  researchers  are  particularly 
concerned  with  the  place  of  nanotechnology  in  a  long  history  of  questions  about  the 
relationship  between  human  biology  and  novel  technologies,  e.g.,  nanotechnological 
enhancements. 
 
Interaction between nano-scale science and engineering researchers on one hand, and CNS 
researchers on the other, is a crucial aspect of the activities. Interaction among the various 
elements  of  RTTA  is  another.  To  address  the  former  challenge,  we  design  CNS-ASU 
intentionally  as  a  boundary  organization  [Guston  1999b],  to  provide  concrete  benefits  to 
participating researchers as well as to facilitate social research and spur societal capacities for 
anticipatory  governance.  To  address  the  latter  challenge,  we  focus  on  the  central  role  of 
activities  like  mapping  the  nanotechnology  enterprise  and  generating  technologically 
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plausible scenarios of nano-technological futures in informing our other research (RTTA thus 
incorporates  aspects  of  evaluation  and  forecasting  into  TA  work).  We  also  interweave 
research,  educational,  and  outreach  activities  across  CNS  to  enhance  interactivity  and 
opportunities for substantive, procedural, and reflexive learning. 
 
Through this complex of RTTA activity, CNS-ASU hopes to build a greater societal capacity 
to  engage  in  anticipatory  governance  of  nanotechnology:  from  increasing  public 
understanding of and engagement in nanotechnology, to rendering nano-scale science and 
engineering researchers more reflexive about their own work and its consequences for society. 
Decision-makers are one among many target groups for dissemination of RTTA findings, but 
scientists and engineers themselves are the critical target group, as RTTA aspires to cultivate 
a more reflexive, more anticipatory, and more engaged scientific disposition. CNS-ASU can 
thus provide descriptive and analytic information for scholars and decision makers, but it can 
also potentially seed a cultural change in science that will make knowledge-based innovation 
and the people who do it more familiar with, and receptive to, governance. 
 
New TA in the Netherlands: CTA, bypassing the Collingridge Dilemma 
As we saw above, participatory TA projects are well founded in the Dutch/EU style of doing 
TA.  More  recently  we  see  that  TA  projects  are  also  linked  up  with  ‘big  science  and 
technology’ projects and sometimes even incorporated in them. In the case of nanotechnology 
in  The  Netherlands  this  is  done  through  NanoNed,  a  nation  wide  consortium  for 
nanotechnology.  TA  practices  are  embedded  in  and  funded  by  this  scientific  endeavour. 
Projects are carried out at universities around the Netherlands. Here, we discuss one of these 
projects executed at the Innovation Studies Group at the Utrecht University. A reason for TA 
practitioners to choose this setup is a tendency among TA practitioners to “be there” as early 
as possible, to ‘get the chance to do it right from the start’. When these two points merge we 
end up with participatory TA approaches, for emerging technologies. Taking the well-known 
Collingridge dilemma [Collingridge, 1980] into consideration, in early  stage technologies, 
chances for improvement are richest, but directions for improvement and further development 
hard to find; this project strives to bypass this dilemma. 
 
Since nanotechnology is an awkward bundle of exotic technologies simply defined by scale, a 
choice  for  the  subject  still  has  to  be  made.  Here,  we  choose  Lab-on-a-chip  for  medical 
applications technology that, in contrast to most other nanotechnology applications, has a few 
applications on the market and is used in practice. Therefore, although still being an emerging 
technology, the relevant actors can more easily be identified, because some structure is in 
place. We find another issue of interest when we look at the technological field itself. In the 
case of Lab-on-a-chip technology, not completely, but to some extent accidentally, we found 
a field that “longed” for CTA kind of activities [in terms of de Bruijn et al, [2002] there is a 
‘sense  of  urgency’).  This  was  revealed  by  interviews  with  the  science  and  business 
community. 
 
Which actors to include in the CTA when applications are almost non-existent, and taking 
into account there is a clear lack of visibility outside the scientific and pioneering business 
arena? CTA strives to incorporate all relevant actors in the process. Looking at which actors 
will have a say in the development and use of the technology sooner or later gives anchor 
points to find the actors. Heuristics as the innovation chain, innovation systems, and social 
maps provide the necessary intellectual tools to do this. The actors where invited iteratively, 
meaning feedback from the actors was used in the course of the project. This assumes an   18 
important point of TA, which is that TA is an ongoing process where steering along-the-way 
is a necessity. 
 
The approach consisted of the following 3 steps: (1) providing information to the participants, 
(2) constructing individual scenarios, and (3) dialogue workshops. Follow-up interviews are 
used as part of the data on which the impacts of the approach can be assessed. The project 
recognizes the interface between insiders and outsiders [21], where insiders work towards the 
realization of the technology and are committed to its success (e.g., science and business), and 
outsiders are selectors in the sense of having multiple options to solve their problem of which 
the technology under discussion is just one (e.g., professional users and ministries). 
 
We thus managed to perform a CTA on an emerging technology. The impact that is aimed for 
was, among others, seen in terms of increased anticipation, reflection, and learning. This in 
turn creates awareness of how socio-technical dynamics work and broadening of perspectives 
of the involved actors. Both are necessary for actors to change their actions, the only way real 
influence on innovation processes can be expected. 
 
Impact assessment of both approaches 
RTTA at CNS-ASU, as of this writing just one year old, is still too young to have concrete 
impacts  that  can  be  easily  measured  –  especially  given  the  difficulty  of  identifying  such 
impacts. Yet there are some early indications of the kind of impacts that RTTA might have, 
particularly on the target audience of nanotechnology researchers. 
 
In terms of impact on content, CNS-ASU has begun to educate through coursework modest 
numbers  of  undergraduates  in  the  societal  implications  of  nanotechnology  and  provide 
opportunities for the engineering, design, and business students in InnovationSpace to create 
new nanotechnological  product concepts.  At the  graduate level, CNS-ASU has begun to 
‘cross-train’ several nano-science doctoral students to enable them to include research on 
societal questions about their own nano-science in their dissertations.   By the account of one 
laboratory director, engagement with CNS-ASU has resulted in the success of a large grant 
proposal, which was more socially aware and problem-oriented than the first version of the 
proposal, which had been rejected.  We have also begun to generate substantive knowledge in 
a  variety  of  areas,  in  particular  an  operationalisable,  social  science  definition  of 
nanotechnology (Porter, Youtie, and Shapira, 2006). 
 
At  the  procedural  level,  we  have  influenced  Mike  Roco  (2006),  the  principal  policy 
entrepreneur of the US National Nanotechnology Initiative, to adopt CNS-ASU’s terminology 
of “anticipatory governance” as a goal for addressing the societal implications of emerging 
nanotechnologies.    We  have  also  argued  for  a  greater  attention,  in  the  area  of  human 
nanotechnological  enhancement,  to  a  frame  that  includes  attention  to  democratic  political 
values (Parsi, Tosi and Guston, forthcoming) and to the role and particular needs of persons 
with disabilities (Wolbring, 2006). 
 
The impact of the CTA example is discussed now. An important effect in terms of content is 
that most actors realized the value of discussing views and applications with different actors 
early  in  the  development  of  the  technology,  i.e. their  thinking  about  the  future  of  the 
technology, reflected in their work, changed. Some even said their assessment for cooperation 
is now broader. There is a strong wish to have more events that also include a wide variety of 
actors. This is an important learning point that, due to the collective effect, can also be seen as 
a small change in the frame of reference of the participants. At the same time, actual changes   19 
in action are marginal. It can be the case that this is a longer-term effect (as some participants 
indicated), although this remains to be seen. Having more than one workshop would probably 
also be beneficiary on this point, which can be taken as a lesson for other TAs. 
The process dimension focuses on three questions: did we succeed in getting the ‘right’ user 
involvement, did we succeed in providing effective support to participate in the discussion, 
and did we succeed in facilitating the interface between insiders and outsiders? The involved 
actors originated from science, business (SMEs and large firms), professional users (general 
practitioners  and  hospital  care),  ministries,  financial  institutions,  and  health  care  insurers. 
Listening to the participants during the follow-up interviews, this actor involvement was just 
about right. The participants indicated they were content with the process and the support 
(making the scenarios which prepared them for the workshop) given to them. The workshop 
itself  was  stimulating  and  generally  (besides  some  comments)  found  useful.  Since  the 





In this final section we want to highlight the implications of our foregoing discussion on three 
aspects of TA that are central to our concerns:  its development; its impacts and its role as SI 
in innovation policy.   
 
Development of TA 
Did TA actually develop from a watchdog functon into a tracker function, or are we, over the 
years, more and more looking at TA through a different analytic lens?  If, as we argue, the 
former is the case,  can  we go  even further to conclude that a ‘dominant TA design’ has 
evolved? 
 
An innovation systems perspective obviously provides an analytical lens for understanding 
TA that is distinct from the lens provided by the linear model. The history of TA practice, 
however, clearly shows real and substantial changes in the institutionalization and practice of 
TA itself. Whereas OTA carried out its TA in the relative isolation of its office and much TA 
in Europe in the early days was carried out by committees of experts (as for instance the 
Rathenau  committee)  and  TA  institutes  were  not  very  well  linked  to  other  actors  in  the 
innovation systems (as for instance most parliamentary TA organizations in their early days), 
TA has, since the mid 1990s at least, beome something rather different. TA nowadays is far 
more process oriented, more inclusive of relevant actors, and better linked to those circles that 
have a real say in the innovation process.  
 
The  explicit  goals  of  TA  have  also  changed  from  informing  a  limited  set  of  actors  on 
emerging technologies and their impact, towards identifying involved actors, articulating their 
information needs, and stimulating and feeding learning processes. TA methodology in the 
watchdog era hardly paid any attention to working with stakeholders to formulate problem 
definitions.  Indeed,  watchdog  TA  can  be  understood  not  as  a  process,  but  as  an  event 
charcterized by formal methods and techniques carried out by centralised TA institutions with 
rather simple interfaces with users and policy. Nowadays much attention in TA is paid to 
defining the problem in a carefully designed participatory process with a focus on learning. 
While  watchdog  TA  was  a  multidisciplinary,  scientific  endeavour,  TA  now  can  be 
characterized as a trans-disciplinary activity carried out in a distributed infrastructure using a 
mixture of formal and process oriented techniques. The interfaces between the heterogeneous   20 
set of actors are carefully designed to serve multiple perspectives to the extent possible. All in 
all, we may conclude that the tracker drove away the watchdog not only in the perspective of 
the analyst but also in daily practice. 
 
During this change a sometimes intense interaction between policy, theory and practice has 
been  visible.  New  insights  from  innovation  studies  (innovation  systems,  evolutionary 
approaches, the role of users) influenced TA and policy-makers, and experiences with TA in 
practice served as empirical input for innovation researchers. The interaction between TA and 
policy however has remained problematic, with policy makers often unwilling or unable to 
absorb results of tracker TAs.  We speculate that this is because the insights of TA do not 
easily translate to actionable knowledge in the daily work of policy-makers. 
 
Will  TA  continue  to  evolve?  In  innovation  theory,  innovations  go  through  a  process  of 
variation  and  selection  [Utterback,  1994]  resulting  in  what  is  called  a  ‘dominant  design’. 
Might such an account apply to TA? In answering this question we first have to realize that in 
this chapter we limit ourselves to a special type of TA: public sector, focusing on knowledge 
based innovation and social implications. Furthermore it should be obvious that despite some 
general trends, captured in the notion of the tracker, many different TA approaches are still 
visible.    To  speak  of  a  ‘dominant  design’  thus  would  not  acknowledge  this  richness. 
Nonetheless, we feel it reasonable to conclude that a class of TA with the characteristics of 
the  tracker  may  be  viewed  of  as  a  promising  strand  of  Strategic  Intelligence,  and  an 
improvement over the watchdog function. 
 
Impact 
How should we conceive of the idea of impact of SI, and TA in particular. and how can such 
impact be measured? 
 
In our overview of attempts to evaluate TAs we argued that impact should not be understood 
or assessed in terms of influence on particular decisions. For one thing, evaluating TAs in this 
way does not make much sense as long as policy makers do not ask the questions TA can 
answer. More importantly, innovation theory is not a theory of decisions but of systems and 
networks.  Thus, regarding OTA it can be concluded that ‘To talk about OTA’s influence on 
innovation  policy  is  to  talk  about  its  impact  on  little,  rather  than  its  little  impact’.  
Understanding  TA’s  impact  thus  in  part  awaits  further  development  of  innovation  theory 
(researching implications for policy of the systems of innovation approach, (see Part III) and 
further development of innovation policies (implementing insights from innovation studies in 
policy,  see  chapter  Teubal  et  al).  Our  view  is  that  TA  impact  must  be  understood  as  a 
multidimensional  phenomenon  (content  and  process)  and  that  determining  impact  is 
impossible without consensus on a well defined and shared problem definition, specifying 
explicitly the type of impacts to be expected, as developed by relevant actors taking into 
account the context and institutional limits in which the TA should be performed. As a matter 
for future research, proper evaluation of TA can build on in-depth analysis on a case-by-case 
basis;  past  TA  projects  should  be  a  rich  source  of  information  for  developing  a  useful 
approach to impact assessment. 
 
TA and Policy 
In conceptualizing TA as an important strand of SI in systemic innovation policies, what are 
the barriers to fruitful use of TA in innovation policy, and how can TA more succesfully 
contribute to such policies in the future? 
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Our  understanding  of  systemic  innovation  policy  makes  it  clear  that  actors  involved  in 
innovation  processes  need  SI  that  support  them  in  developing  visions  and  strategies  and 
turning these strategies into action. We concluded that the characteristics of this type of SI 
match up well with important characteristics of tracker TA, particularly the support of actors 
in their learning processes, the commitment to  process-based information supply,  and the 
focus on  a heterogeneous set of  actors  engaged in the innovation process rather than the 
output of R&D activities. Smits and Den Hertog [2007] present a number of possibilities for 
how  TA  may  aid  systemic  innovation  policies  (see  table 3),  drawing  in  turn  on  the  five 
systemic instruments as discussed in the chapter by Teubal et al. 
 
Table 3: The possible role of TA and users in a modern innovation policy (Smits  & den 
Hertog, 2007) 
Innovation  system 
functions 
Possible roles of TA and users 
Managing interfaces  ￿  Involve users in innovation initiatives in sectors/ fields 
￿  Stimulate user-producer relations (per cluster) 
￿  Create a TA section in innovation research (‘TA-begleitforschung’) 
￿  Assess intermediaries as ‘brokers’ between knowledge demand and knowledge 
supply 
Building  and  organising 
(innovation) systems 
￿  Give users a role in innovation networks and systems with regard to newly 
emerging technologies. 
￿  Collect  and  concentrate  systemic  knowledge  with  regard  to  the  steering  of 
innovation systems 
￿  Conduct strategic TA studies in selected sectors / domains 
￿  Review  the  operation  of  existing  innovation  systems  (e.g.  clean-up  and/or 
reorientation of the existing knowledge infrastructure) 
Creating  forums  for  learning  and 
experimenting 
￿  Involve users as co-developers in innovation experiments. 
￿  Develop  innovation  forums  connected  to  social  issues  (safety,  healthcare 
quality, administrative innovation) 
￿  Experiment with demand-driven innovation (e.g. in the steering of a part of the 
public knowledge infrastructure) 
￿  Experiment with public/private knowledge institutions (along the lines of the 
Technologische Topinstituten in the Netherlands) 
￿  Experiment with systemic innovation instruments 
￿  Conduct constructive TA studies 
￿  Experiment with strategic niche and transition management 
Establishing  an  infrastructure  for 
strategic intelligence 
￿  Conduct awareness TA studies 
￿  Make use of synergies between exploration communities, TA, and evaluation, 
and create a central strategic intelligence clearing house 
￿  Invest in policy learning on the basis of strategic intelligence studies 
￿  Challenge TA researchers to come up with concrete proposals for innovation 
policy 
￿  Contribute to a (distributed) strategic intelligence infrastructure 
￿  Give users and/or potential users access to the strategic intelligence function   22 
 
Stimulating  demand  articulation 
and  development  of  strategy  and 
vision 
￿  Invest  in  forms  of  public  participation  such  as  public  debates,  consensus 
conferences,  constructive  TA,  scenario  workshops,  and  round-table 
conferences 
￿  Stimulate the parliamentary debate on issues involving science, technology, 
and innovation 
￿  Start a discussion on the structure of the national innovation system or parts of 
it (the arrangement of the  knowledge infrastructure) 
￿  Develop nationwide innovation strategies in social domains 
 
Yet we are still left with the challenge of barriers between TA and policy makers. 
Policymakers often do not use insights from TA, sometimes because they are not aware of the 
results, but more often because the results do not seem relevant to them. Despite great 
conceptual advances, innovation policy in most OECD countries is largely characterised by 
[Smits & Kuhlmann, 2003]: 
 
·  a high degree of departmentalisation, sectoralisation of the political administration, and low inter-
departmental exchange and cooperation 
·  heterogeneous, non-inter-linked arenas: often corporatist negotiation deadlocks (e.g. health 
innovation related policy in Germany) 
·  failing attempts at restructuring responsibilities in government because of institutional inertia (e.g. 
Germany, Netherlands, UK ...) 
·  dominance of "linear model" of innovation in policy approaches (and of related economists as 
consultants) in many national authorities (e.g. ministries) 
·  conceptualisation of "innovation policy" as a very specific, narrow field focusing closely on 
introduction of new technologies in SMEs, IPR or VC issues etc. 
Innovation  policy  itself,  that  is,  still  often  fails  to  embrace  the  known  complexities  of 
innovation  processes.    A  key  issue  of  systemic  innovation  policy,  therefore,  is  the 
involvement of a "new breed" of innovation policymakers, employed under the rules of a 
more flexible staff policy (e.g. supporting job rotation with industry or non-governmental 
organizations), working in a reformed, systemically interlinked institutional setting, fostering 
experimentation and learning and starting from a nonlinear, more systemic perspective on 
innovation. 
A further development of systemic instruments is necessary to help this new breed of policy 
makers play their role in an effective and efficient way. Innovation studies may be helpful in 
this  context  by  taking  stock  of  already  existing  systemic  instruments  and,  based  on  this, 
conducting a thorough analysis of the functions such instruments can fulfill and the situations 
in  which  they  can  be  applied.  Innovation  studies  may  provide  additional  help  for  policy 
makers by furthering the insight into the dynamics of innovation systems and in the links 
between  learning  at  the  micro  level  with  characteristics  of  the  overarching  system.  The 
already  mentioned  ‘functions  approach’  (see  chapter  Jacobsson  et  al)  appears  to  be  a 
promising avenue to realize this. 
This brings us to the contribution TA researchers and practitioners may provide. Apart from 
the possible roles as already outlined in table 3, TA researchers and practitioners could also 
benefit from a greater integration of the insights provided by innovation studies. Until now, 
TA  researchers  and  innovation  scholars  often  operate  in  two  different  and  separate 
environments, hardly referring to each other’s work. The same is true for TA researchers and 
policy makers. TA researchers need to invest more in matching their problem definition, goals 
and  methods  with  the  needs,  possibilities  and  limitations  of  policy  makers.    Institutional 
innovations that allow for greater cross-fertilization among innovation policy makers and TA   23 
practitioners may be a central part of any successful effort to enhance the value of TA for 
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